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The Renaissance introduced the autonomy of being human which in turn resulted in promoting 
the position of human understanding as the formal law-giver of nature. Twentieth century 
philosophy of science acknowledged the necessity of a theoretical frame of reference (paradigm) 
as well as ultimate (more-than-rational) commitments. Historicism and the linguistic turn, 
however, relativized the objectivity and neutrality of scientific reason (with its universality) and 
co-influenced the rise of postmodernism. After discussing the distinction between linear and non-
linear thinking it is shown that Derrida does accept universality outside the human mind. The 
denial of ontic universality influenced the nominalistic orientation of modern biology, particularly 
since Darwin’s Origin of Species, consistently denying the reality of type laws. Under the spell 
of Leibniz’s slogan that nature does not make leaps, as natural selection merely exemplifies the 
overriding law of continuity. Darwin was in two minds about accepting his biological idea of non-
progression and his socio-cultural conservatism in which progress was dominant. More recently 
new atheism divinized natural laws, identified them with human reason, while Hawking even 
claims that the law of gravity would create the universe out of nothing. Finally physicalism is 
subjected to immanent criticism, the pretence that mathematics is exact is questioned and some 
recent problems facing neo-Darwinism are highlighted. 1
Keywords:  autonomy, law-giver, historicism, paradigm, ultimate commitment, atheism, epigenetic 
information, out of nowhere origination
Die Renaissance-waardering van die mense se outonomie het uitgeloop op die verheffing van die 
menslike verstand as die formele wetgewer van die natuur. Nogtans sou die wetenskapsfilosofie 
van die twintigste eeu erkenning verleen aan die noodsaaklikheid van ‘n teoretiese 
verwysingsraamwerk (paradigma) en ‘n diepste (meer-as-rasionele) grondoortuiging. Die 
historisme en die taalwending het die idee van ‘n objektief-neutrale rede gerelativeer en bygedra 
tot die ontstaan van die postmodernisme. Na ‘n bespreking van die onderskeiding tussen liniêre 
en nie- liniêre denke is aangetoon dat Derrida universaliteit buite die menslike gees erken. Die 
ontkenning van ontiese universaliteit het die nominalistiese oriëntasie van die moderne biologie, 
veral sedert Darwin se Origin of Species beïnvloed – wat konsekwent die realiteit van tipe-wette 
misken het. Betower deur die slagspreuk van Leibniz dat die natuur nie spronge maak nie sien 
Darwin natuurlike seleksie bloot as ‘n beliggaming van die oorkoepelende wet van kontinuïteit. 
Darwin was in twee verdeel tussen sy biologies-non-progressionistiese benadering en sy sosiaal-
kulturele konserwatisme waarin die idee van vooruitgang dominant was. Meer onlangs sou die 
nuwe ateïsme natuurwette goddelik ag en met die menslike rede vereenselwig, met Hawking 
wat selfs beweer dat die swaartekragwet uit niks die heelal sal skep. Ten slotte is die fisikalisme 
aan immanente kritiek onderwerp, is die aanspraak dat die wiskunde eksak is bevraagteken en is 
saaklik aandag geskenk aan enkele resente probleme waarmee die neo-Darwinisme worstel.
Sleutelwoorde: outonomie, wetgewer, historisme, paradigm, grondoortuiging, ateïsme, 
epigenetiese informasie, van nêrens af ontstaan
1  An earlier version of this article was presented as a Stoker-Lecture at the University of North West, September 2013.
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1 KEY ELEMENTS OF MODERNITY
Since the Renaissance the deification of reason, already found in 
Greek culture, has experienced a new secularized revitalization. 
What it left behind is the Greek-Medieval realistic metaphysics 
which used the concept of being to generate a hierarchical view 
of reality. The human being is no longer understood as being 
part of an objective order of being. For Descartes even certainty 
about the existence of God is now obtained only on the basis 
of clear and distinct thinking. Von Weizsäcker points out that 
the world no longer guarantees my existence since the world 
now solely appears as the object of my self-assured thinking. In 
a subtle way this self-assured thinking is elevated to the rank 
of what is divine. Therefore it should not be surprising that the 
new motive of logical creation soon inspired Immanuel Kant 
to elevate human understanding to become the formal law-
giver of nature. More recently the desire to be liberated from 
“supra-natural” Gods led atheists (or rather: anti-theists) to the 
identification of God with the laws of nature, forgetting that 
Nietzsche already realized that laws are distinct from a Law-
giver. In support of the cause of atheism, Nietzsche therefore 
prefers not to speak of laws but rather of necessities (see Strauss, 
2009:408). The fusion of human rationality and natural law 
culminates in Hawking’s recent idea that the law of gravity on 
its own could well create the universe.
2 BEYOND POSITIVISM: THE IDEAL 
OF AN OBJECTIVE AND NEUTRAL 
SCIENCE CHALLENGED
Kant’s view of understanding as formal law-giver of nature 
consolidated the preceding natural science ideal of modern 
humanism and provided the platform for the ideal of an 
objective and neutral science advanced by positivism – from 
Auguste Comte up to the Vienna Circle. However, as one of the 
key figures in the mid-twentieth century philosophy of science, 
Karl Popper claimed the fame to have “killed” positivism (see 
Popper, 1974:69). Kuhn challenged the positivist appeal to 
“facts” (identified with sense data) for it turned out that the 
interpretation of facts is embedded in theoretical frameworks 
(designated as paradigms), captured in the slogan the facts 
are “theory-laden.” In addition, prominent figures within the 
domain of the philosophy of science of the twentieth century 
acknowledged that scholarly activities are embedded in 
intellectual communities and in the final analysis directed by 
more-than-theoretical (i.e. supra-theoretical) commitments, 
as emphasized by  Popper and Stegmüller. Karl Popper stated 
that the faith in the rationality of reason is not itself rational 
– he speaks about “an irrational faith in reason” (Popper, 1966-
II:231). Stegmüller holds the view that there is not a single area in 
which self-assured of human thinking is possible – one already 
has to believe in something, in order to justify something else 
(Stegmüller, 1969:314)
Yet, in spite of all these developments, most special scientists 
working within the natural sciences and the humanities are 
still victims of a kind of “naïve positivism”, still adhering to 
the modernist idea of the objectivity and neutrality of science. 
The remarkable exception in this regard is the well-known neo-
Darwinian biologist Stephen Gould (initial field: palaeontology) 
who updated himself with what happened in the philosophy 
of science of the previous century. He remarks: “Facts have no 
independent existence in science, or in any human endeavor; 
theories grant differing weights, values, and descriptions, even 
to the most empirical and undeniable of observations” (Gould 
2002:762).
If the deified human understanding assumed the role of judge, 
even regarding the existence of God, then the authority assigned 
to it not only gives it the power to decide what will count as 
divine, but also endows it with the power to deny any divinity 
whatsoever – the ultimate position of contemporary atheism. 
Many of these atheists justified their stance with reference to 
atrocities committed in the name of “religion” (such as 9/11). 
Already during the Enlightenment Kant advocated an elevated 
position for human reason:
Our age is, in every sense of the word, the age of criticism 
and everything must submit to it. Religion, on the strength 
of its sanctity, and law on the strength of its majesty, try to 
withdraw themselves from it; but by doing so they arouse 
just suspicions, and cannot claim that sincere respect 
which reason pays to those only who have been able to 
stand its free and open examination (Kant, 1781:A-12 – 
translation F.M. Müller – see Müller, 1961:21).
3 RELATIVIZING HUMAN REASON: 
HISTORICISM AND 20TH CENTURY 
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
Of course closer scrutiny soon reveals that neither the 
(persistent) positivism nor the new atheism represents a sound 
position. In particular the pervasive influence of historicism 
during the nineteenth and early twentieth century relativized 
the certainties of modernity. In the “linguistic turn” historicism 
found a strong ally, for with language as horizon alternative 
interpretations surfaced prominently.
As noted briefly above, these lines of thought served as points 
of departure for developments within the philosophy of 
science of the twentieth century. It appeared to be inevitable 
to use theoretical frameworks (paradigms) which themselves 
are in the grip of ultimate commitments. Interestingly these 
developments within twentieth century philosophy of science 
were anticipated by Dooyeweerd. It prompted Van Peursen 
to say that Dooyeweerd’s philosophy is today more relevant 
than ever and he added the remark that many books written 
within the domain of philosophy of science should not have 
been written, had the authors first read what Dooyeweerd had 
written (see Van Peursen 1995).
4 POSTMODERNISM: THE RELATIVITY 
OF INTERPRETATION
The combined effect of historical relativity and alternative 
interpretations in turn gave rise to postmodernism according 
to which every so-called meta-narrative is questioned, owing 
to the fact that everyone of us only disposes over our own 
particular stories. The new kind of knowledge emerging within 
the postmodern mode of thought apparently challenged long-
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standing conceptions. Amidst the introduction of themes and 
entities, such as fractals (somewhere in between one and two 
dimensions) and chaos theory, it is claimed that modernist 
thinking is linear and postmodern thinking is non-linear. 
Lyotard mentions “incommensurabilities” and the fact that 
“the continuous differentiable function is losing its pre-
eminence as a paradigm of knowledge and prediction” and 
then continues: “Postmodern science – by concerning itself 
with such things as undecidables, the limits of precise control, 
conflicts characterized by incomplete information, ‘fracta,’ 
catastrophes, and pragmatic paradoxes – is theorizing its own 
evolution as discontinuous, catastrophic, nonrectifiable, and 
paradoxical” (Lyotard, 1987:60).
5 IS POSTMODERNISM CHARACTERIZED 
BY NON-LINEAR THINKING?
Without properly specifying in which sense they speak of linear 
thinking postmodern thinkers pursue the ideal of non-linear 
thinking. Mathematicians speak of linear equations when, for 
example, there are two variables that are related in a specific 
way. Co-ordinate geometry says that points whose co-ordinates 
satisfy an equation of the first degree, such as y = ax + b (with 
a and b as constants), are lying on a straight line. An equation 
such as y = x2 is therefore non-linear. Postmodern authors 
want to distance themselves from the rationalistic trait of 
“modern science” with its reductionism and faith in numbers. 
In opposition to this “out-dated” mode of thinking such 
postmodern thinkers advocate a non-linear mode of thinking, 
apparently built upon a methodology of intuition and of 
subjective observation, exceeding human rationality. Sokal and 
Bricmont mention the words of a postmodern thinker, Robert 
Markley, who claims that “quantum physics, the bootstrap 
theory, the theory of complex numbers, and chaos theory 
share the basic assumption that reality cannot be described in 
linear concepts, that non-linear – and non-solvable – equations 
provide the only possible means to describe a complex, chaotic 
and non-deterministic reality” (Sokal & Bricmont 1999:166, 
note 26).
On the same page they highlight the fact that many postmodern 
authors interpret chaos theory as a revolution directed against 
Newton’s mechanics, with quantum theory as an example of 
non-linear thinking. Unfortunately Newton’s “linear thinking” 
contains equations which are fully non-linear. In reality many 
examples of chaos theory derive from Newton’s mechanics, 
which means that chaos research is in fact nothing but a 
Renaissance of Newton’s mechanics. Even more embarrassing 
is the fact that while quantum physics is currently represented 
as a prime example of “postmodern science,” it is not realized 
that the basic equation of quantum physics, the well-known 
Schrödinger equation, is absolutely linear (Sokal & Bricmont 
1999:166-167). Moreover, there are very difficult linear 
problems and quite simple non-linear problems. Contrary to 
a widespread misunderstanding a non-linear system is not 
necessarily chaotic. 
6 IS DERRIDA A POSTMODERN 
THINKER?
Postmodern thinkers tend to shy away from universality by 
emphasizing what is particular or singular. Caputo mentioned 
to Derrida that in connection with justice and care in Derrida’s 
writings he discerns a resonation of the biblical concern for 
singularity. This is opposed to the “philosophical notion where 
justice is defined in terms of universality” (Derrida 997:20). 
Remarkably Derrida’s reaction was immediately to emphasize 
the unbreakable co-existence of universality and singularity: 
“I would not oppose, as you did, universality and singularity. I 
would try to keep the two together” (Derrida 1997:22). According 
to Derrida faith is universal, it displays a universal structure 
and for this reason it should be distinguished from “religion.” 
Actually, for him there is “no such thing as ‘religion’.” There are 
only singular religions, such as Judaism, Christianity, Islam and 
so on. This distinction between (universal) faith and (particular) 
religions runs parallel with his distinction between messianicity 
and messianism (Derrida 1997:21) and it explains his mode 
of speech where he declares: “So this faith is not religious, 
strictly speaking; at least it cannot be totally determined by a 
given religion. That is why this faith is absolutely universal. 
This attention to what is the singularity is not opposed to 
universality” (Derrida 1997:22).
Derrida here undoubtedly explores the ontic universality 
of “faith,” of “messianicity” and so on – which disqualifies 
him, strictly speaking, from being a postmodernist thinker, 
for postmodernism generally attempts to shy away from 
universality. Since the era of Enlightenment the trust in universal 
(conceptual) knowledge guided the idea of rational progress. 
One way to define rationalism is actually to see it as a reification 
of conceptual knowledge. Likewise, irrationalism can then be 
defined as a deification of concept-transcending knowledge 
(idea-knowledge), focused on what is unique, individual or 
singular.
7 THE NOMINALISTIC RESTRICTION 
OF UNIVERSALITY: LAW AND 
REGULARITIES
The decisive role played by nominalism in modern philosophy 
since the Renaissance is seen in its denial of universality 
outside the human mind: universality is only and solely 
acknowledged within the human “mind”. That we actually 
have to account for two kinds of universality is often concealed 
behind interchangeably employing expressions such as law, 
law for, order for, orderliness of, lawfulness of, law-conformity, 
regularities and so on. Whatever meets the order for its 
existence behaves in an orderly fashion, manifested in its own 
orderliness or law-conformity. An order for and the 
orderliness of is equivalent to the conditions for the 
existence of something and meeting those conditions. 
In general there is a strict correlation between law and 
what is factually subjected to it. But when reality (the ontic) 
is stripped of its universality, then it is at once deprived 
of its order for side as well as the orderliness of reality conforming 
to this order. What is lost sight of is the fact that denying 
universality “outside the human mind” did not succeed in 
getting rid of universality because the feature of being individual 
universally holds for whatever is individual.
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In spite of his sharp critical analysis of the ideas of Hawking, 
John Lennox still does not properly distinguish between law 
and regularity: “Newton’s laws describe the regularities, the 
pattern, to which motion in the universe conforms under 
certain initial conditions. It was God, however, and not Newton 
who created the universe with those regularities and patterns” 
(Lennox 2011a:35). Law-conformity is a feature of what is 
subjected to laws and the only way to understand physical 
laws is to study the regularities evinced in their behaviour. It 
would therefore be better to say that Newton’s laws are human 
formulations of the God-given laws for nature, making possible 
all the regularities we can observe and describe. God did not 
create the regularities, for what has been created function in an 
orderly way, providing scholars with those regularities pointing 
at the God-given creational laws.
8 TYPE-LAWS AND MODAL 
LAWS VERSUS NOMINALISTIC 
CLASSIFICATION
This entails that we have to acknowledge the universality 
of different types of entities, because our experience is not 
populated by just one kind of entity, whatever it may be. No one 
would defend the view that everything is an x – where x could 
be filled in by: “a quark”, “an atom”, “a cell” or whatever. The 
diversity of entities within the horizon of human experience 
straightforwardly necessitates the acknowledgement of 
a multiplicity of types or kinds. The ontic reality is that the 
correlation between law and factuality cannot avoid the idea 
of type-laws. Yet since the dominant nominalistic assumption 
of modern philosophy denies universality outside the human 
mind, the entire system of biological classification is reduced 
to a functionalistic (physicalistic) perspective. Simpson 
categorically states that organisms are not types and do not have 
types (Simpson 1969:8-9). This view continues the conviction 
of Darwin that “no line of demarcation can be drawn between 
species” (Darwin 1859:443) which entails that according to 
Darwin “we shall have to treat species in the same manner 
as those naturalists treat genera, who admit that genera are 
merely artificial combinations made for convenience” (Darwin 
1859:456).
The discreteness (discontinuities) marking the currently 
existing diversity of plants and animals as well as the dominant 
theme of palaeontology (stasis/constancy: a type abruptly 
appears, remains constant over millions of years and then 
suddenly disappears) squarely contradicts Darwin’s core 
scientific belief that there must have been an infinitesimal, 
incremental and continuous development stretched over 
millions of years. A contemporary neo-Darwinist, Jerry Coyne, 
openly struggles with the tension between discreteness and 
continuity. He advances the view that species are discrete 
clusters of living entities: “And at first sight, their existence 
looks like a problem for evolutionary theory. Evolution is, 
after all, a continuous process, so how can it produce groups 
of animals and plants that are discrete and discontinuous, 
separated from others by gaps in appearance and behavior?” 
(Coyne 2009:184). He also designates a species as “a discrete 
cluster of sexually reproducing organisms” and then on the 
same page he continues in a realistic fashion by maintaining 
that the discontinuities of nature are “not arbitrary, but an 
objective fact” (Coyne 2009:184). Whereas Darwin therefore 
advocated a nominalistic position regarding living entities, 
Coyne reverts to a realistic idea of living entities.
9 THE LEVELLING TENDENCY IN THE 
POSTULATE THAT NATURE DOES NOT 
MAKE LEAPS
Within modern philosophy the emphasis soon shifted to 
functional relations which, particularly in the thought of 
Leibniz, resulted in his famous lex continui (law of continuity) 
according to which nature does not make any leaps (natura non 
facit saltus). Dooyeweerd characterized this view as the continuity 
postulate of humanistic philosophy and Gould argues that this 
postulate assumed in Darwin’s thought even a more central 
position than natural selection. He calls upon the physicist 
and historian of science, Silvan S. Scheber when he claims: “In 
fact, I would advance the even stronger claim that the theory 
of natural selection is, in essence, Adam Smith’s economics 
transferred to nature” (Gould 2002:122). And gradualism 
precedes in importance natural selection. Gould relates 
Darwin’s position here to a confusion of the different senses of 
gradualism, for example the validity of natural selection and 
the acceptance of slow and continuous flux: “This conflation 
came easily (and probably unconsciously) to Darwin, in large 
part because gradualism stood prior to natural selection in the 
core of his beliefs about the nature of things. Natural selection 
exemplified gradualism, not vice versa – and the various forms 
of gradualism converged to a single, coordinated view of life 
that extended its compass far beyond natural selection and 
even evolution itself” (Gould 2002:154-155).
10 CHANCE VERSUS PROGRESS: 
INCONSISTENCIES ON OPPOSING 
SIDES OF THE DEBATE
Yet in spite of his achievements as a radical intellectual, 
advocating a theory without any claims to progress, Gould notes 
that Darwin considered it as his greatest failure that he did not 
succeed in reconciling his intellectual rejection of progress 
with his acceptance of a cultural context in which progress was 
one of the characteristics of the Victorian culture to which he 
belonged (see Gould 2002:467). Darwin holds that his greatest 
improvement compared to other evolutionary theories is given 
in banishing inherent progress. Gould writes: “Moreover, 
Darwin regarded the banishment of inherent progress as perhaps 
his greatest conceptual advance over previous evolutionary 
theories.” And to this he adds the words of Darwin, formulated 
in reaction to the progressionist palaeontologist Alpheus 
Hyatt (on December 4, 1872): “After long reflection I cannot 
avoid the conviction that no innate tendency to progressive 
development exists” (Gould 2002:468). Ironically, close to the 
end of The Origin of Species, we read: “And as natural selection 
works solely by and for the good of each being, all corporeal and 
mental endowments will tend to progress towards perfection” 
(Darwin 1859:459). Since Aristotle vitalistic theories in biology 
assumed that goal-directedness (finality/purpose) is inherent 
to living entities, something rejected by Darwin in the words 
just quoted. Theistic evolutionists of our day deem it possible 
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to accept Darwin’s views (on random variation and natural 
selection) and at the same time advance the (contradictory) 
view that God guided the process of evolution all the way. 
Sometimes emergent-evolutionism, which wants to have it 
both ways – continuity in descent and discontinuity in existence 
– also surfaces in the thought of theistic evolutionists. The 
theologian Wentzel Van Huyssteen on the one hand holds that 
our universe and “all it contains is in principle explicable by the 
natural sciences” (Van Huyssteen, 1998:75). But a bit further in 
this work he alleges the opposite when he warns that we should 
not overextend rationality “to explain everything in our world 
in the name of natural science” (Van Huyssteen 1998:115). Later 
on he believes that cultural evolution (including the evolution of 
ideas, scientific theories, and religious worldviews) cannot be 
reduced to biological evolution (Van Huyssteen 2006:86-87). 
On the basis of his emergent-evolutionistic view Klapwijk also 
attempts to combine neo-Darwinian chance with purpose (see 
Klapwijk 2008 and 2009).
Gould explains that within the fossil record there is no clear 
signal of progress:
I believe that the most knowledgeable students of life’s 
history have always sensed the failure of the fossil record to 
supply the most desired ingredient of Western comfort: a 
clear signal of progress measured as some form of steadily 
increasing complexity for life as a whole through time. 
The basic evidence cannot support such a view, for simple 
forms still predominate in most environments, as they 
always have. Faced with this undeniable fact, supporters of 
progress (that is, nearly all of us throughout the history of 
evolutionary thought) have shifted criteria and ended up 
grasping at straws (Gould 1996:166-167).
The idea of type-laws, briefly alluded to above, containing 
an acknowledgement of different types of living entities 
constituted by a limited number of them falling within each 
“type-category,” is eliminated in the nominalistic classification 
of neo-Darwinism with its claim that “organisms” are not types 
and do not have types (Simpson). The popular contemporary 
reference to “bio-diversity” is actually stripped of meaningful 
content, because if the classification of living entities is merely 
the result of arbitrary and artificial thought constructions, 
lacking an ontic foundation (in the reality “out there”), then the 
intended diversity (reflecting typical differences determined by 
distinct type-laws) collapses into a structureless continuum. 
The speculative continuity postulate still rules the day!
11 BIO-DIVERSITY AND THE ONTIC 
DIVERSITY OF UNIVERSAL MODAL 
ASPECTS
The denial of the specified universality entailed in type-laws 
finds its foundation in a more basic misunderstanding, which 
is given in denying the “ontic diversity” of functional (modal) 
aspects. It is the merit of reformational philosophy that it 
subjected the multiple functions or modal aspects of our 
experiential world to a transcendental-empirical analysis. 
The key idea is that the ontic universality of each one of these 
aspects, from the numerical up to the certitudinal aspect, co-
determines whatever there is. Every concrete (natural and 
societal) entity functions within all these aspects which not 
only serve as modes of being and modes of experience but also as 
modes of explanation. When particular modes of explanation 
are over-emphasized at the cost of other modes of explanation 
– just recall the words of Van Huyssteen that our universe and 
all it contains “is in principle explicable by the natural sciences” 
– a reductionist approach surfaces, denying the ontic diversity of 
modal aspects.
12 THE IMPASSE OF CONTEMPORARY 
PHYSICALISTIC MATERIALISM
The physicalistic or materialistic orientation of neo-Darwinism 
and of the new atheists has currently succeeded in establishing 
a firm hold on scholarly journals and the public media. Their 
ultimate reductionist claim is that “everything is material”. 
Such a materialistic view in the final analysis believes, as Roy 
Clouser phrases it, “that reality is ultimately physical, so that 
everything is either matter or dependent upon matter”. Clouser 
also mentions Paul Ziff who once remarked that he is not certain 
why he is a materialist: “It’s not because of the arguments. I 
guess I’d just have to say that reality looks irresistibly physical 
to me” (Clouser 2005:38).
Apart from trying to give an answer to the difficult question: 
“What is matter?” the basic statement that everything is material 
is self-defeating. Merely contemplate the status of laws holding 
for material things. They are not themselves material, just as 
little as the conditions (laws) for being an atom is itself an atom. 
But if the conditions (laws) for being material are not themselves 
material, then the claim that everything is material does not 
hold, because the physical laws for matter are not material. In 
addition the statement that everything is material is presented 
as being true. But truth is a matter of epistemology and logic, 
not a physical one. Moreover, the statement is formulated in 
a sentence, showing that we have to distinguish between the 
logical-analytical aspect (the basic statement) and the lingual 
aspect of the utterance (the sentence formulated). That is to 
say, the basic conviction of physicalism (materialism) could be 
approximated from different modes of experience. However, as 
long as “laws of nature” are accepted, the atheist will constantly 
be haunted by the quest for the Creator of such laws, the search 
for the Law-Giver.
13 ASSIGNING CREATIONAL POWER 
TO A CREATURE: PHYSICAL LAWS 
DIVINIZED
Therefore the last step in the attempt to get rid of the Creator is, 
as Lennox phrases it, to confer “creatorial powers on something 
that is not in itself capable of doing any creating” (Lennox 
2011:52). This something may be scientific theories or even 
the laws addressed in such theories. According to Lennox for 
these scientists and philosophers “the term ‘God’ has become a 
synonym for the laws of nature” (Lennox 2011a:22). In order to 
get rid of God Stephen Hawking settled for the law of gravity as 
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the substitute ultimate origin of the universe. In his book, The 
Grand Design (co-author is the physicist Leonard Mlodinow) we 
read:
Because there is a law such as gravity, the universe can and 
will create itself from nothing. Spontaneous creation is the 
reason there is something rather than nothing, why the 
universe exists, why we exist.
The law of gravity now replaces God – forgetting that it is 
merely a God-given creational law. Hawking also forgets that 
every physical law is always related to what is subjected to it 
and correlated with it. Lennox aptly remarks that laws create 
nothing in any world for they can only “act on something 
that is already there” (Lennox 2011:71). Ironically enough, no 
single physical law could be explained in a purely physical way 
because the physical aspect of reality does not exist in isolation 
from the other aspects of reality. Newton’s formulation of the 
law of gravitation contains the term force (F), the gravitational 
constant (G), two mass-points (m1 an m2), and the distance 
between m1 and m2 (r). The gravitational force between m1 and 
m2 is directly proportional to the product of their masses and 
indirectly proportional to the square of the distance between 
them. But mass is a physical quantity (highlighting the 
fundamental connection between the physical aspect and the 
numerical aspect). Distance, in turn, pre-supposes the meaning 
of (physical) space, whereas the idea of a constant reveals the 
coherence between the meaning of the physical aspect and 
a uniform [constant] motion. From this it appears that the 
formulation of the law of gravitation is made possible in the 
first place by the coherence of the physical aspect with three 
foundational non-physical aspects (namely number, space, and 
movement). These non-physical aspects serve as the foundation 
for the meaning of the physical aspect. Formulated in terms 
of the theory of modal aspects, the law of energy-constancy, 
for example, analogically reflects the kinematic meaning of 
constancy on the law-side of the physical aspect.
Given these conditions and interconnectedness one may well 
ask: how could these non-physical aspects (and, for that matter, 
the universe itself) then merely emerge from the physical aspect 
of creation or originate from a physical law? Hawking attempts 
to pull himself up with the bag in which he positioned himself – 
something clearly seen by Lennox. Of course the law of gravity 
is something implying that if the universe is created by this 
law the starting-point is something (the law of gravity) and 
not “nothing.” The statement “the universe can and will create 
itself from nothing” is self-contradictory: “If I say ‘X creates 
Y’, this presupposes the existence of X” (Lennox 2011a:32). 
Materialism simply entangles itself in unsolvable antinomies – 
the “reward” for not respecting the God-given creational laws 
in their uniqueness and unbreakable coherence distinguishing 
between God and God’s law.
14 LAW AND LAW-CONFORMITY
The only way in which we can approximate the laws for physical 
entities is through an investigation of their orderliness, law-
conformity or regularities. The above-mentioned example 
used by Derrida concerning the universal structure of faith 
(messianicity) and particular (“singular”) religions, implicitly 
alludes to the universality of the certitudinal aspect of reality. 
Particularly in respect of the conviction (!) of the new atheists 
that they do not have faith at all, the modal universality of the 
faith aspect implies the opposite. But we have noticed that if 
one does not accept God as Creator, the only alternative is to find 
a substitute within creation – and in the case of contemporary 
atheism this substitute for God is most of the time found 
in matter. The ultimate commitment of the new Atheists is 
therefore justly characterized as materialistic or physicalistic 
– and it is inevitably caught up in the above-mentioned 
inconsistencies.
15 “FAITH AND REASON”
Materialism over-emphasizes a single mode of explanation, 
namely the physical. However, such an orientation embodies a 
more-than-theoretical commitment – just recall the remark of 
Paul Ziff who said “that reality looks irresistibly physical to” him. 
No reason is given, just an underlying trust in (physical) reason! 
It represents therefore a particular faith in reason, namely the 
trust in the rational reliability of physical reasoning. The onto-
diversity of modal aspects is challenged from the outset.
From this state of affairs we can conclude that “faith” (“trust”) 
inherently belongs to the practice of the natural sciences. 
What is more is that “rationality” (or: “reason”) is connected 
to faith in the sense of intellectual trust. Yet in the course of 
the historical development of Western philosophy “reason 
and faith” eventually appeared in opposition to each other, as 
if each on its own is an entity in its own right. Quite recently 
this is still done by Pope John Paul II in his Encyclical Letter 
Fides et Ratio (1998). In this letter he portrays both as entity-
like, inter-dependent realities. He claims that faith does not 
fear reason but trust it: “Faith therefore has no fear of reason, 
but seeks it out and has trust in it” (John Paul 1998). Of course 
thinking (“reason”) and believing (“faith”) are concrete acts of 
human beings which, like every concrete (natural and social) 
structure or event, in principle function within all the aspects 
of reality. The latter, namely the dimension of aspects, provides 
a universal modal order co-determining concrete events and 
processes. In an ontic sense they lie at the foundation of our 
experience of entities and their functions. Therefore the first 
level of investigating the interconnections between “faith” and 
“reason” should commence with an analysis of the meaning of 
the logical-analytical aspect and the meaning of the certitudinal 
aspect, abstracting for the moment from the fact that every 
concrete act of faith at once functions in the logical-analytical 
aspect and that every concrete thought-act also functions 
within the faith aspect.
The terms trust or certainty may be used to capture the core 
meaning of the faith aspect. The inter-modal coherence 
between the various ontic aspects entails that the terms 
trust and certainty will also appear within other aspects in an 
analogical way, normally captured in compound phrases such as 
legal trust, social trust, moral trust and economic trust (credit). 
Given the order relation between the logical and certitudinal 
aspects an expression such as intellectual trust highlights a 
forward-pointing connection between the logical and faith 
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aspects, in technical philosophical parlance also designated as 
a certitudinal anticipatory analogy between these two aspects. 
Likewise configurations such as legal trust, social trust, moral 
trust and economic trust reveal anticipations from the legal, 
social, modal and economic aspects to the faith aspect.
In the same way the faith aspect reveals its unique meaning 
only in coherence with all the other aspects of reality, including 
the logical-analytical aspect. The core meaning of the logical 
aspect is found in analysis (identification and distinguishing). 
When we therefore lack faith distinctions in our trusting and do 
not identify the core elements of our faith we will end up with 
a “blind faith”. Therefore it should be acknowledged that there 
also exists an intrinsic connection between the faith aspect and 
the logical-analytical aspect, manifest in faith distinctions and 
identifying what is crucial to faith convictions. 
“Reason” and “faith” surely are not “strangers” because human 
acts qualified either by the logical aspect or the certitudinal 
aspect structurally display an internal coherence with the non-
qualifying aspects of acts like these.
16 TRUST IN REASON
In respect of the nature of intellectual trust this insight is 
acknowledged in his own way by the philosopher of science, 
Wolfgang Stegmüller, where he explains that one first has 
to believe in something in order to justify something else 
(Stegmüller 1969:314). Nonetheless an uncritical adherence 
to what we have earlier designated as a “naïve positivism” is 
still widespread. Special scientists and laymen think that the 
ultimate judge of truth is “science” – the assumed anonymous 
(rational) power supposedly capable of solving all our 
problems. The scope of “science” is restricted to mathematics, 
physics and (the physical or molecular foundations) of biology. 
This modernist over-estimation of “science” up to the present 
implicitly continues the modern natural science ideal of 
objectivity and neutrality.
17 POSITIVISM AND THE HISTORY OF 
THE CONCEPT OF MATTER
In the case of positivism the criterion of sense perception 
matches the (internally antinomic) reductionism found in 
materialism because it cannot account for the epistemic 
status of descriptive terms derived from what we have called 
the onto-diversity of modal aspects. Once something has been 
observed (sensed) it is in need of a scientific description and 
every description has to employ specific terms. However, the 
history of the concept of matter shows that alternative modes 
of explanation have been chosen. It commenced with the 
Pythagorean belief that everything essentially is number, then 
it continues with the switch within Greek mathematics to 
geometry (after die discovery of incommensurability – the fact 
that it is not possible to describe all spatial relationships merely 
in terms of fractions), then, after the Renaissance, the choice for 
(reversible) motion as basic denominator, and finally reaching 
the current state of physics which had to acknowledge that 
(irreversible) energy-operation characterizes the uniqueness of 
this aspect.
Clearly, during the history of physics different modal ponts of 
entry were used in describing material entities, namely the 
numerical, the spatial, the kinematic and the physical. But 
since these functional modes of reality are not concrete entities 
or events themselves, they are not open to the senses as such. 
One cannot weigh, smell, hear, feel or see anyone of these 
aspects, simply because they are not belonging to the entitative 
dimensions of reality.
The classical positivist neutrality postulate had to face 
other objections as well. Perhaps the most important of 
these objections are related to the history of every academic 
discipline, which relativizes any temporarily (assumed) “up-
to-date” theoretical stance. Whatever is currently appreciated 
as the “generally accepted” standpoint within the discipline 
differs from what the case fifty, hundred or more years ago 
was, apart from the fact that the majority is not a yardstick for 
truth (as correctly identified in text books on logic where one of 
the informal fallacies is designated as the majority fallacy; see 
Bowell and Kemp, 2005:131 ff.). And within the forthcoming 
decades and millennia the emphasis may shift again and again.
18 HOW “EXACT” IS SCIENCE?
This explains why not even the “exact” discipline of 
mathematics succeeded in avoiding concurrent and successive 
alternative theoretical stances. The remarkable historical fact 
is that the three main sub-divisions of Kant’s Critique of Pure 
Reason (1781) provided the starting-point for the three main 
schools of thought found in twentieth-century mathematics: 
intuitionistic mathematics explored the transcendental 
aesthetics (Brouwer & Weyl), logicism, the transcendental 
analytic (Russell & Gödel) and axiomatic formalism, the 
transcendental dialectics (Hilbert & his followers).
Regarding the mathematical status of intuitionism Beth 
writes: “It is clear that intuitionistic mathematics is not merely 
that part of classical mathematics which would remain if one 
removed certain methods not acceptable to the intuitionists. 
On the contrary, intuitionistic mathematics replaces the 
methods by other ones that lead to results which find no 
counterpart in classical mathematics” (Beth 1965:89). But listen 
to what Brouwer himself has to say. He believes that “classical 
analysis … has less mathematical truth than intuitionistic 
analysis” (Brouwer 1964:78) – to which he adds in respect of the 
differences between intuitionism and formalism:
As a matter of course also the languages of the two 
mathematical schools diverge. And even in those 
mathematical theories which are covered by a neutral 
language, i.e. by a language understandable on both 
sides, either school operates with mathematical entities 
not recognized by the other one: there are intuitionist 
structures which cannot be fitted into any classical logical 
frame, and there are classical arguments not applying 
to any introspective image. Likewise, in the theories 
mentioned, mathematical entities recognized by both 
parties on each side are found satisfying theorems which 
for the other school are either false, or senseless, or even 
in a way contradictory. In particular, theorems holding 
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in intuitionism, but not in classical mathematics, often 
originate from the circumstance that for mathematical 
entities belonging to a certain species, the possession of a 
certain property imposes a special character on their way 
of development from the basic intuition, and that from 
this special character of their way of development from 
the basic intuition, properties ensue which for classical 
mathematics are false. A striking example is the intuitionist 
theorem that a full function of the unity continuum, i.e. a 
function assigning a real number to every non-negative 
real number not exceeding unity, is necessarily uniformly 
continuous (Brouwer 1964:79).
Beth elaborates this divergence in a broader context by 
mentioning multiple other orientations informed by distinct 
philosophical positions and he even questions the appreciation 
of axiomatic set theory as the ultimate foundation of 
mathematics (Beth 1965:161-203). Differences such as these 
prompted the mathematician Kline to come up with a pretty 
negative assessment of the situation within mathematics:
The developments in the foundations of mathematics 
since 1900 are bewildering, and the present state of 
mathematics is anomalous and deplorable. The light of 
truth no longer illuminates the road to follow. In place of 
the unique, universally admired and universally accepted 
body of mathematics whose proofs, though sometimes 
requiring emendation, were regarded as the acme of 
sound reasoning, we now have conflicting approaches 
to mathematics. Beyond the logicist, intuitionist, and 
formalist bases, the approach through set theory alone 
gives many options. Some divergent and even conflicting 
positions are possible even within the other schools. 
Thus the constructivist movement within the intuitionist 
philosophy has many splinter groups. Within formalism 
there are choices to be made about what principles of 
metamathematics may be employed. Non-standard 
analysis, though not a doctrine of any one school, permits 
an alternative approach to analysis which may also lead to 
conflicting views. At the very least what was considered 
to be illogical and to be banished is now accepted by some 
schools as logically sound (Kline 1980:275-276).
The topicality of these diverging orientations is currently still 
reflected in the encompassing Oxford Handbook published by 
Oxford University Press in 2005 on philosophy, mathematics 
and logic – with Shapiro as Editor (833 pages). This work 
inter alia contains contributions on empiricism and logical 
positivism (1), on logicism (3), on Wittgenstein (1), on formalism 
(1), on intuitionism (3), on naturalism (2), on nominalism (2) 
and on structuralism (2).
An article on “non-denumerability” which appeared in the 
Journal Koers shows that alternative philosophical assumptions 
regarding the nature of the infinite lead to mutually opposing 
interpretations (see Strauss 2011). Interestingly, the editor of 
an accredited journal refused to publish this article because one 
of the reviewers objected by stating that it might mislead the 
youth to think that mathematics is not “an exact science”!
In addition to the extensive quote from Brouwer given above, 
we may challenge the idea of an exact science by briefly looking 
at the impasse of arithmeticism, such as the argumentation 
of Grünbaum published in 1952 aimed at to explaining the 
continuous extension of a straight line as being constituted by 
non-extended elements. This circularity is only apparent when 
it is realized that whereas our awareness of succession (and 
discreteness) originally belongs to the irreducible core meaning 
of number, the awareness of a totality (a whole with its parts) 
originally belongs to the core meaning of the spatial aspect. 
Once this is seen, it is clear that the idea of infinite totalities 
merely represents an anticipatory analogy pointing from the 
numerical aspect to the spatial aspect. However, the idea of 
an infinite totality presupposes the idea of the at once infinite 
(traditionally known as the actual infinite), which stands 
and falls with the deepening or disclosure of the meaning of 
number under the guidance of the meaning of space. For this 
reason the at once infinite in principle differs from the primitive 
meaning of infinity in the literal sense of one, another one, yet 
another one, and so on (traditionally known as the potential 
infinite but preferably designated as the successive infinite – 
endlessness). The decisive point in the argument pursued by 
Grünbaum is given in the employment of the at once infinite 
which is needed in Cantor’s proof of the non-denumerability of 
the real numbers. If the real numbers cannot be enumerated, 
they cannot be added – apparently providing an opening for 
degenerate intervals to constitute a measure larger than zero 
(practically boiling down to adding zeros in order to exceed 
zero, apparently justified by the fact the addition is not defined 
in the case of non-denumerable infinity). Grünbaum writes 
explicitly: “The consistency of the metrical analysis which I 
have given depends crucially on the non-denumerability of 
the infinite point-sets constituting the intervals on the line” 
(Grünbaum 1952:302). Therefore the entire arithmeticistic 
argument begs the question. The attempted arithmetization 
crucially depends upon the use of the idea of infinite totalities, 
which needs the at once infinite, and which finally presupposes 
the irreducible meaning of the spatial order of at once and the 
(correlated) spatial whole-parts relation.
19 RECENT CHALLENGES TO NEO-
DARWINISM
The perspective which we have advanced thus far challenged 
the idea of “an exact science.” But since biology is oftentimes 
incorporated in the restricted notion of “science” we now 
briefly highlight some of the increasing problems facing neo-
Darwinism with its law-like mechanism of random mutation 
and natural selection (of course, accepting the constancy of 
this mechanism contradicts the neo-Darwinian claim that 
“everything changes”).
In the Prologue of his recent book, Darwin’s Doubt (2013), Stephen 
Meyer states the following in connection with the assumed 
origination of the first living entities: “The type of information 
present in living cells – that is, ‘specified’ information in 
which the sequence of characters matters to the function of 
the sequence as a whole – has generated an acute mystery. No 
undirected physical or chemical process has demonstrated the 
capacity to produce specified information starting ‘from purely 
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physical or chemical’ precursors. For this reason, chemical 
evolutionary theories have failed to solve the mystery of the 
origin of first life – a claim that few mainstream evolutionary 
theorists now dispute” [This book is dedicated to the mystery 
of the Cambrian explosion (initially estimated to have occurred 
within a time-span of 20 to 40 million years, but now reduced to 
5–6 million years (Meyer 2013: 72).]
Although neo-Darwinians therefore have to concede that 
the origination of the first living entity is a mystery, they 
still BELIEVE that it did happen “spontaneously”, through 
purely material processes. However, apart from the extreme 
improbability of such a process, there are no clues as to how 
the information found in living entities came into being – the 
“hardware” (material) does not explain the “software” (such as 
ordered DNS sequences, epigenetic information or complex 
proteins). 
The equally mysterious appearance of new animal phyla during 
the Cambrian explosion is now attributed to information not 
stored in genes, namely epigenetic information. Add to this that 
similar information sequences do not affirm common ancestor 
genes. The reality that genes with information-rich sequences 
cannot be derived from common ancestral genes, is underscored 
by recent “genomic studies which reveal that hundreds of 
thousands of genes in many diverse organisms exhibit no 
significant similarity in sequence to any other known gene” 
(Meyer 2013:215). In addition Meyer mentions that these ORFfan 
genes (derived from “open reading frames of unknown origin”) 
have “turned up in every major group of organisms, including 
plants and animals as well as both eukaryotic and prokaryotic 
one-celled living entities. In some organisms, as much as one-
half of the entire genome comprises ORFan genes” (Meyer 2013: 
216). While having no homologs ORFans cannot be related to 
a common ancestral gene, a “fact tacitly acknowledged by the 
increasing number of evolutionary biologists who attempt 
to ‘explain’ the origin of such genes through de novo (‘out of 
nowhere’) origination” (Meyer 2013:216). Clearly, questions 
concerning origins increasingly recede into the mystical 
realm of “coming from nowhere” (which is synonymous with: 
ultimately we do not know and approximating the possibility of 
creation)!
Likewise, the Cambrian expert, Douglas Erwin (trained at the 
University of California), in collaboration with Eric Davidson, 
“have now ruled out standard neo-Darwinian theory” because 
it “gives rise to lethal errors”, to which Erwin and Davidson add 
that no current theory of evolution explains the origin of the de 
novo body plans found in the Cambrian explosion (see Meyer 
2013:356). On the same page Meyer mentions Erwin saying 
that establishing these novel body plans does not have “any 
parallel to currently observed biological processes” because he 
insists that the events of the past were fundamentally different. 
Meyer summarizes this succinctly: “the cause responsible for 
generating the new animal forms, whatever it was, must have 
been unlike any observed biological process operating in actual 
living populations today” (Meyer 2013:356). When the principle 
of uniformity is challenged the door is opened for speculating 
about origination phenomena which are indeed unlike any 
biotical processes observed in currently living populations.
How can anyone come to terms with the uncertainties and 
speculation increasingly surrounding (and even rejecting) the 
neo-Darwinian mechanism of random mutation and natural 
selection? Reverting to “out of nowhere” and a “fundamentally 
different past” underscore the mystery surrounding the unique 
origination of living entities, including the evidence of the 
Cambrian explosion which, according to Erwin and Davidson 
(2002), is not accounted for by any known (micro or macro) 
theory of evolution.
20 CONCLUDING REMARK
In conclusion, it should be mentioned that implicit in our 
entire preceding analysis of the shortcomings in and problems 
of postmodernism, positivism and atheism one can discern 
key elements of a non-reductionist ontology motivated by the 
supra-theoretical ultimate commitment to accepting God as 
Creator of the universe in Whom all things hang together. The 
idea of type-laws (with their specified universality) and the idea 
of universal (unspecified) modal laws occupy a key position 
in such a non-reductionist ontology. We are indebted to the 
founders of this philosophical legacy who developed their 
crucial insights during the first half of the previous century. 
Among them also Stoker articulated his own assessment of what 
those who are involved in scholarship should acknowledge. 
He did this within the perspective of Christianizing all of life 
(Stoker 1967:65) which for him entailed the idea of God’s law-
order (Stoker 1967:52) on the basis of explicitly promoting the 
ideal of a non-reductionist ontology (Stoker 1967:61).
It is a privilege to be able to make a humble contribution to 
the further development of this philosophical legacy at an 
institution where Professor Stoker spent his fruitful academic 
career.
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